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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
From the reported cases, it would appear that the Mineral Code
is serving fairly well as a guide to people in handling mineral rights
transactions and in resolving possible disputes. Many of the cases
reaching the appellate courts do not involve matters covered by the
Mineral Code. Nevertheless, several of the cases do indicate areas
where the Mineral Code could be more specific or where it could
have pretermitted controversies had it addressed the subject. The
significant appellate cases involving mineral rights can be regarded
as falling in four basic categories.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Three cases were decided which turned upon points basically
procedural in nature. Two of these were decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
Trinidad Petroleum Company v. Pioneer Natural Gas Company'
was a case brought by a lessee against his lessor to assert the continued existence of a lease and to seek damages. A blowout had occurred on the lessee's well which, the lessee contended, prevented
further operations for a time. The lessor granted a lease to another
party, taking the position that plaintiff's lease had terminated,
despite the plaintiff's contention that the force majeure clause of the
lease prevented termination during cessation of production for the
blowout.
The trial court dismissed the action on the lessor's exceptions of
no cause and no right of action. Upon appeal, the third circuit initially
reversed and remanded but granted a rehearing after which it ruled
that the plaintiff's appeal had not been timely.2 The third circuit
characterized the plaintiff's action as a possessory action; thus it had
to be appealed within thirty days? The appeals time for an ordinary
action is sixty days,4 and plaintiff's appeal was filed within sixty
days. Thus the issue on appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court was
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 381 So. 2d 808 (La. 1980).
2. Id. See also Trinidad Petroleum Corp. v. Pioneer Natural Gas Co., 381 So. 2d
834 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (the third circuit's ruling).

3.

LA. CODE

Civ. P. art. 3662.

4.

LA. CODE

Civ. P. art. 2087.

19811

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 19 79-1980

whether it was proper to characterize plaintiff's suit as a possessory
action.
The supreme court reversed the third circuit, holding that the
plaintiff's suit was an ordinary action, and thus its appeal had been
timely. It remanded to the third circuit because that court's initial
decision (remanding for a trial on the merits) never had become
final.
The court reviewed the pertinent provisions of the Mineral Code
and the Code of Civil Procedure indicating that a mineral right is a
real right which may be asserted by possessory action or other action.' Ordinarily, however, a lessor and lessee may not assert the
possessory action against one another since the lessee possesses for
and under the lessor. The Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that the real actions cannot be asserted by the lessor (or
possessor bound by a lease) against the lessee "on account of the
termination of the lease by running of the term or occurrence of an
express resolutory condition." 6 The court felt that since the
plaintiff's action was simply the inverse of this, the plaintiff could
not maintain a possessory action. It stated that although the pleadings were couched in the terms and form of a possessory action, the
claims were more in the nature of a suit based on the obligations of
the parties under their contract. Hence, the court viewed the parties
as urging an ordinary action rather than a real action. As an ordinary action the appeal had been filed timely.
The proper venue for litigation over the terms of a gas purchase
contract was at issue in Hawthorne Oil & Gas Corporation v. Continental Oil.7 The third circuit had held that the gas purchase contract had multiple objects involving immovable rights-rights of ingress and egress to lay pipelines and construct facilities-as well as
rights to movables (the gas after production).' Thus, the court of appeal held that the place of the immovable rights was the proper
venue.9 The supreme court reversed.
The opinion of the supreme court was that the gas purchase con5. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3664 & 3665. See also LA. R.S. 31:12, 18, & 23 (Supp.
1974).
6. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3670.
7. 377 So. 2d 285 (La. 1979).
8. 368 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
9. Id. The third circuit looked to article 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provides in pertinent part:
The following actions shall be brought in the parish where the immovable
property is situated:
(1) An action to assert an interest in immovable property, except as other
wise provided in Articles 72 and 2633 ....
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tract had a single object, the sale of a movable." The contract provisions concerning rights-of-way were incidental and nonessential stipulations, and no relief for or adjudication of immovable rights was
sought. Recission or reformation of the contract would have had, the
court observed, at most only an incidental effect on immovabJe property.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Dixon turned upon his view that the
rights were to be classified immovable as applying directly to the
land. The parties to the gas purchase contract attempted to limit
the power of the lessee to assign the lease without making the
assignment subject to the gas contract. Since this affected the lease,
Mr. Justice Dixon felt it affected an immovable and thus came within the language of article 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is to be noted that the Mineral Code has been amended to
make the gas purchase contract subject to the laws of registry."
The characterization of a contract right in relation to certain
mineral leases also was at issue in Hobbs v. Central Equipment Rental. 2 The plaintiffs and defendants (counterclaimants) had entered into an unwritten contract for operations on a mineral lease they apparently owned in indivision. Under the contract the plaintiffs, the
two Hobbs brothers, were to maintain the well (or wells) on the
lease, and defendants, the Hances (Central Equipment Rentals, Inc.),
were to provide a laborer as well as their share of the financial expenses in the operation of the wells. When the final well on the
lease ceased production in February, 1973, the partners decided to
plug and abandon the well.
Each of the parties sought bids for the work, but plaintiffs then
informed defendants they were not financially able to contribute to
the plugging and cleanup operations. Thereupon Sam Hance contracted with several companies to perform the work which was completed entirely at the expense of the Hances. With the great increase in the value of oil field equipment in the wake of the 1973
10. The Louisiana Supreme Court looked to article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part:
The general rules of venue are that an action against:
(4) A foreign corporation licensed to do business in this state shall be brought
in the parish where its principal business establishment in the state is located, as
designated in its application to do business in the state.
11. See LA. R.S. 31:212.1 (Supp. 1979). This provision was added by Acts 269, § 2
of 1979. The comment to this statute notes that the amendment "preserves the distinction between a mineral right and contracts disposing of or hypothecating the minerals
themselves after severance."
12. 382 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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Arab embargo, plaintiffs brought suit for conversion, contenaing
that had they been allowed to do the work themselves, they could
have sold the salvage at great profit. They claimed damages of
$329,811.86. Defendants reconvened for plaintiffs' share of the cost
of cleanup and ad valorem taxes paid by defendants. The trial court
ruled for the defendants on the claims of the plaintiffs and on defendants' reconventional demand.
On appeal to the third circuit, the plaintiffs argued that it was
error for the trial court to admit parol evidence of the agreement
between the plaintiffs and defendants because the rights and obligations affected mineral leases and thus became incorporeal immovable rights requiring written instruments or proof. The court rejected this contention. It stated:
The contracts in dispute were for the removal of equipment
from and the plugging of defunct oil wells. The contracts in no
way purported to affect any rights or title to the mineral leases
per se. The equipment used to extract the oil from the reservoir
was not so situated as to be of a permanent nature. The equipment would have to be removed as soon as the wells ceased producing in paying quantities and were abandoned. The contracts
involved in this litigation have a single object; the removal of
production equipment from and the plugging of non-producing
wells."
Since only rights pertaining to movables were involved, no writing
was necessary. In so holding, the court relied on the supreme court
opinion in Hawthorne." The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contentions on several other assignments of error and thus affirmed the
trial court's judgment.
CONVEYANCING PROBLEMS

Several cases have arisen that have required interpretation or
construction of documents to ascertain what was conveyed between
the parties. Two of these are straightforward applications of well-accepted principles and should pose no problems for the future. The
third of these, however, is of considerable significance for future
mineral development in the state. It is Continental Group v.
Allison.15 Because it is on appeal and may soon be decided by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, Continental Group will be described only
briefly.

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 242.
See note 7, supra.
379 So. 2d 1117 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. granted, 383 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
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Involved in Continental Group v. Allison was a reservation of all
mineral rights in a sale of more than 90,000 acres in 1956. In accordance with the established principle which is now written into the
Louisiana Mineral Code," each separate tract had to be treated as a
separate servitude. It was stipulated by the parties at the trial that
on those noncontiguous tracts upon which no drilling or attempted
development had taken place for a period of ten years or more, prescription had run and the servitudes had terminated. At issue, however, was who had the right to produce lignite, a form of coal which
is to be mined principally by strip mining. Was it to be the party
which reserved all mineral rights, or the owner of the land? A further issue concerned the effect of drilling for oil on the running of
prescription as to the lignite.
The trial court held that the reservation of all mineral rights did
not serve to create a servitude as to the right to produce lignite by
strip mining. While the court recognized that the reservation reasonably could be read to include only those minerals whose development did not interfere significantly with use of the surface, or all
minerals, regardless of the effect of the development of the surface
by the purchaser, it concluded that the former was preferable in
view of the Civil Code's policy favoring interpretation which least
restricts the ownership of the land conveyed. Since the court ruled
lignite was not reserved, it had no reason to rule on the issue of interruption of prescription on one mineral by operations for another.
The second circuit reversed.'8 The court of appeal reviewed the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, surrounding the negotiations and bearing on the intent of the parties in 1956, and it concluded
that "the parties intended that solid material could be extracted by
the open-pit or strip-mining process from beneath the surface of the
lands in the exploitation of the servitude.' 9 Other factors, such as
knowledge of existence of the lignite prior to the agreement, were
given by the court as support for its conclusion. The court specifically
noted but declined to follow the Texas rule that mineral substances
which can be extracted only by strip-mining belong to the surface
owner and not to the mineral owner and that the mineral owner may
not strip-mine unless the mineral grant expressly provides for the
16. LA. R.S. 31:64 & 73 (Supp. 1974).
17. Article 753 of the Civil Code of 1870, referred to by the trial court, provides:
"Servitudes which tend to affect the free use of property, in case of doubt as to their
extent or the manner of using them are always interpreted in favor of the property to
be affected." Act 514, § 1 of 1977 added article 730, which simply replaced the above
article of the 1870 Code with no substantive change.
18. See note 15, supra.
19. 379 So. 2d at 1126.
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right to strip-mine. 0 Despite its holding in favor of the owners of
the mineral reservation, the court recognized that this did not permit them to exercise their rights arbitrarily or without due regard
for the rights of the landowner.21
On the issue of interruption of prescription as to lignite by oil
and gas operations, the court followed articles 36 and 40 of the
Mineral Code, which expressly provide for this result.22 While the
Mineral Code was not in-effect until January 1, 1975, the court felt
the issue had not been resolved before adoption of the Mineral
Code; the Code's provisions were the proper resolution and were in
accord with prior authorities.
At issue in Lowry v. MRT Exploration23 was whether a 1966
conveyance of property with a reservation of mineral rights by
three brothers to another party created one mineral servitude or
three. If three were created, then liberative prescription had not
been interrupted as to all of the property. The property on which
the minerals were reserved was owned in indivision and the reservation was simply to the vendors.
The second circuit court of appeal upheld the trial court's award
of summary judgment. The court ruled that the reservation created
a single servitude, and its use by one co-owner inured to the benefit
of the others. The holding on both points is in accord with the
Mineral Code.
Patrick Petroleum Company v. Poche25 presented a controversy
as to whether a 1936 conveyance created a fractional mineral servitude or a mineral royalty. If it was a royalty, it had prescribed,
since there had been no production on the tract in question since
1955.6 If it was a mineral servitude, prescription was interrupted by
drilling operations conducted on the tract in 1965 and 1974.27
Examining the instrument and subsequent documents, the
fourth circuit concluded that the trial court was correct in construing the instrument as creating a mere royalty interest. Thus prescription had not been interrupted, and the royalty had expired. The
court focused on the references in the instrument and other agree20. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
21. 379 So. 2d at 1130-31.
22. LA. R.S. 31:36 & 40 (Supp. 1974).
23. 382 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
24. See LA. R.S. 31:174 (Supp. 1974) and, by implication, LA. R.S. 31:63, 66, & 67
(Supp. 1974).
25. 384 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
26. See LA. R.S. 31:87 (Supp. 1974).
27. See LA. R.S. 31:29 (Supp. 1974).
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ments (acknowledgments) to "royalty." From the facts given, the
court's ruling was undoubtedly correct, but the court might have
gone further by noting other factors indicating that a royalty was
contemplated. Thus the instrument provided that the interest was
to be free of further cost, an incident of a normal royalty interest.
And, the interest was as to minerals "that may be produced" indicating an interest after production, which is also a characteristic
of a royalty interest.28
While there is no doubt as to the correctness of the court's approach on the question of prescription in Patrick Petroleum Company v. Poche, one might ask whether the pertinent rule of law
makes any sense whatsoever. Why must use of a mineral royalty be
production while use of a mineral servitude can be mere good faith
operations? Why will a dry hole interrupt prescription on a mineral
servitude but not on a mineral royalty created from the mineral servitude? The object of both servitude and royalty is use of the
minerals, and the distinction as to what is necessary to interrupt
prescription seems unsound. Indeed it seems harsh, since the royalty
owner lacks power to go on the land to take steps to interrupt
prescription. Further, it may be a trap for the unwary. The Mineral
Code clearly permits one to alter the normal characteristics of the
mineral royalty and mineral servitude.29 What is to prevent the careful draftsman from describing an interest as a mineral servitude
while giving it most of the characteristics of the mineral royalty,
i.e., creating a cost-free fractional mineral servitude without executive rights or veto power over development? Such an interest would
be similar to a royalty in most respects but would get the more favorable treatment as to interruption of prescription of the mineral
servitude. Perhaps the Mineral Code should be amended to provide
that any act that would interrupt prescription as to a mineral servitude also will interrupt prescription as to a mineral royalty.
LEASE ADMINISTRATION

The case of Arceneaux v. Hawkins" addresses a problem not
specifically provided for in the Mineral Code. The lessors granted
the defendant an oil and gas lease under which they were to receive
a one-sixth royalty. Production was obtained in paying quantities in
July, 1976, and certain quantities of the production were allocated to
plaintiffs' interests. On February 17, 1978, the plaintiffs gave writ28.

On the characteristics of a royalty as opposed to a mineral interest, see H.
1 OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 303-07.4 (1978).
See LA. R.S. 31:72-75 & 103 (Supp. 1974).
376 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).

WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS,

29.
30.
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ten notice of nonpayment to defendant. On February 21, 1978, the
defendant responded that payment had been delayed because of the
complexity of the ownership interests in the tracts of land involved,
and that these interests were being determined. On April 25, 1978,
the defendant tendered payment of the royalties but lessors refused
and filed suit for dissolution of the lease, damages, and attorney's
fees. The trial court sustained the defendant's exception of prematurity and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed and the third
circuit court of appeal reversed and remanded.
Under articles 137 and 138 of the Mineral Code,"1 the lessor
must give the lessee written notice of failure to make timely or
proper payment of royalties as a prerequisite to a judicial demand
for damages or dissolution of the lease, and the lessee has thirty
days after receipt to pay or respond in writing with a reasonable
cause for nonpayment. No article specifies the effect of a nonpayment within the thirty days where a response to the notice is made
timely. From the related Mineral Code articles,32 the court concluded
that the lessor may file suit to have the court determine whether
the cause of delay was reasonable. If so, the damages would be limited to interest on the royalties owed. If the delay was unreasonable, the court may award damages of double the royalty, plus
interest, attorney's fees, and, if the facts so justify, dissolution of
the lease.
Prior to the Mineral Code's adoption, the Louisiana courts had
developed a rule under which lessors could seek lease cancellation
for nonpayment of a royalty without first putting the lessee in default.
The theory was that an unjustified delay in making payment was an
active breach of the lease. The Mineral Code significantly altered
this result by requiring a notice and demand by the lessor, with the
lessee having thirty days in which to respond. If the lessee pays
within the thirty days, the lessor may seek only interest on the
royalties unless the original failure to pay was fraudulent or willful
and without reasonable grounds. Dissolution, although disfavored,
remains a remedy if no payment is made within thirty days.
Arceneaux v. Hawkins addresses a point not made clear in the
Mineral Code. Under its rule the lessee who fails to pay within the
thirty days runs the risk of damages of double the royalties due and
cancellation even if he states in writing a reason for nonpayment.
Poole v. Winwell, Inc.3" raised the issue of what prescriptive
period applies to an action for damages for breach of certain surface
31.
32.
33.

LA. R.S. 31:137-38 (Supp. 1974).
LA. R.S. 31:139-41 (Supp. 1974).
381 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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lease provisions. Defendants were the owners of two surface leases
covering 5.5 acres.34 They maintained an oil and gas gathering facility on the two leased tracts. Plaintiff-lessor brought suit seeking
cancellation of the two surface leases and/or damages for the overflow of salt water on both leased and nonleased portions of his land.
The trial court found that the plaintiff's claim had prescribed
because the damages had occurred more than one year prior to the
filing of the suit. The third circuit reversed, noting that the nature
of the obligation breached determines the applicable prescriptive
period."5 Relying on allegations in the plaintiff's petition, the court
held that the suit was one sounding in contract;36 thus, it was not
barred by the prescriptive period of one year applicable to actions
sounding in tort.37 Nevertheless, the plaintiff's recovery was limited
to those damages attributable to his property lying outside the leased
premises. The court concluded that any determination of damages to
the leased property would be premature, because the leases were
still in effect and the lessees were making good faith efforts to comply with the terms of the leases.
Plaintiff also sought cancellation of the surface leases, alleging
the provisions relating to duration were purely potestative. The provisions provided that the leases would continue in force and effect
so long as minerals were produced. The court upheld the validity of
the leases, finding that such provisions, being dependent on production, are mixed conditions as described in Louisiana Civil Code article 2025. The court went on to note that even if the provisions were
potestative, they would be resolutory potestative conditions, which
are specifically authorized under Civil Code article 2036.3"
CONSERVATION REGULATION AND ITS EFFECTS

In Bernard v. Marathon Oil Company 9 several matters involving
conservation regulation were taken up. The plaintiff-lessor in this
case owned a 9.9 acre tract of land burdened by an oil, gas and
mineral lease. On March 19, 1962, the Department of Conservation
issued Order No. 367-4 creating the Cristellaria No. 6 Sand Unit.
The entirety of the 9.9 acre tract in dispute was included. The S.
Hebert well served as the unit well.
34. It should be observed that this case concerned surface leases, not mineral
leases, and thus the applicability of the Mineral Code was not raised. The case is
nonetheless of interest to operators of mineral leases and is included for that reason.
35. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3531.
36. 381 So. 2d at 928.
37. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 3536.
38. See Long v. Foster & Associates, Inc., 242 La. 295, 136 So. 2d 48 (1962).
39. 381 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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Subsequently, the Department of Conservation created the
Siphonina Davisi No. 1 Sand Unit. This unit included 1.4 acres of the
leased acreage included in the Cristellaria unit. The Siphonina unit
also contained a producing well.
The unit well for the Cristellaria unit (the S. Hebert well) was
shut-in on September 8, 1974, as a precautionary measure because of
a threatened hurricane. Production was not restored until December
of 1976. Plaintiff-lessors sought cancellation of the lease as to that
acreage not within the Siphonina unit pursuant to a lease provision
providing for termination for failure to rework and resume production within sixty days after shutting-in the well.
The third circuit, adopting the opinion of the trial court, found
the lease provision inapplicable and held that production from the
leased premises or lands pooled therewith maintained the entire
lease in effect." Therefore, continuous production from the
Siphonina unit served to maintain the entire lease in effect.
A second claim for cancellation arose from the fact that on May
1, 1975, the Department of Conservation created Siphonina Davisi
No. 3 Sand Unit. This unit included all of the 9.9 acres included in
the Cristellaria unit. The Goldking well served as the unit well.
Although Goldking produced as a unit well from May 1, 1975, the
lessees delayed taking production from the well for eleven months.
Plaintiffs sought cancellation of the lease, alleging defendants failed
to pay shut-in royalties during this period. They also alleged that no
shut-in royalties were paid while the S. Hebert well was shut-in.
The court refused to cancel the lease, holding that where there
is actual production attributable to a mineral lease, there is no additional obligation to tender shut-in royalties in the event a second
well capable of producing in paying quantities is shut-in." Because
there was actual production attributable to the leased premises
(Siphonina Davisi No. 1 Sand Unit Well), the defendants had no obligation to pay shut-in royalties. The court was careful to note that
the lease in question did not contain a provision obliging the lessees
to pay shut-in royalties in the event any well was shut-in, even if
there was actual production attributable to the leased premises.42
Finally, the plaintiffs sought cancellation of the lease pursuant
to certain lease provisions evidencing an intent of the parties that
40. 381 So. 2d at 1288. See LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co., 218 La. 463,
49 So. 2d 855 (1950); Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
41. 381 So. 2d at 1289. See Bennett v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 275 F. Supp. 886
(W.D. La. 1967).
42. The court was distinguishing the case of Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of
Texas v. Miller, 272 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967).
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the lessees should release all portions of the plaintiff's land not
within a unit and not being held by actual production. The plaintiffs
contended that defendants should have released the acreage within
Siphonina Davisi No. 3 Sand Unit after the S. Hebert well discontinued production.
Again, the court refused to cancel the lease, holding the release
clause of the lease inapplicable to the instant situation.43 The court
found that the release clause was intended to serve as a one-time
release requirement which previously had been complied with. Additionally, the court pointed out that the release clause called for the
release of all land outside a unit or units. There was no proof showing the tract in question was ever outside a unit, since nothing in
the record indicated that the order establishing Cristellaria No. 6
Sand Unit was ever dissolved. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court judgment against the plaintiffs.
In Dunn v. Sutton,4 the plaintiff-landowner sought to enjoin
Order 1047 of the Commissioner of Conservation creating a pattern
of drilling and production units for Reservoir A of the Irene Field in
East Baton Rouge Parish. The plaintiff owned a one-acre by twentyacre tract of land adjacent to the eastern boundary of a unit containing a well producing gas and condensate. The plaintiff alleged that
the Commissioner engaged in racial discrimination in excluding his
acreage from the unit.
The first circuit affirmed the trial court judgment dismissing the
plaintiff's suit, holding that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of
showing that the Commissioner's order was arbitrary and
capricious. The court noted that orders issued by the Commissioner
of Conservation enjoy a presumption of validity."
While recognizing that the plaintiff's failure to carry his burden
of proof was sufficient to uphold the Commissioner's order, the court
felt it incumbent that the Commissioner's order be justified due to
the accusations of racism and went beyond the normal, limited scope
of review applied to such administrative determinations. Accordingly, the court reviewed the facts upon which the Commissioner
based his order, ultimately concluding that the order was justified
and that no racial discrimination had been proven.
43. 381 So. 2d at 1290.
44. 378 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 381 So. 2d 1221 (La.
1980) (case was remanded).
45. LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950). See Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786
(1961).

